Haribhau @ Bhausaheb Dinkar Kharuse & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025

The case involved a premeditated attack by six assailants armed with sharp-edged weapons, resulting in the death of one person and grievous injuries to two others (PW-7 and PW-9).

The appellants, although they did not deliver the fatal blow, were accused of facilitating the attack by transporting the armed co-accused to the crime scene and participating in the assault.

The Trial Court had acquitted the appellants.

The Bombay High Court reversed the acquittal, holding them guilty under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 IPC, finding that they were part of the unlawful assembly with a shared common object.

The appellants challenged the conviction before the Supreme Court.

The Court reiterated that under Section 149 IPC, once common object and participation are established, individual overt acts need not be proved.

Citing the precedent in Masalti v. State of U.P. (AIR 1965 SC 202), the Bench reaffirmed that vicarious liability extends to all members of an unlawful assembly acting in furtherance of a shared common object.

The evidence on record demonstrated that the appellants:

• Actively participated in the execution of the assault,

• Facilitated the attack by providing transport for the armed assailants, and

• Were present at the scene, displaying awareness and intent aligned with the common object.

The Court observed that their conduct went beyond passive presence — they were “active participants and facilitators” in a deliberate and planned assault.

Hence, even if they did not deliver the fatal blow, they were vicariously liable for the acts of the group under Section 149 IPC.

The decision reinforces the settled principle of group liability under Section 149 IPC, ensuring that all who share a common object in an unlawful assembly are equally accountable for acts committed in furtherance of that object.

The Court relied on Masalti v. State of U.P. (1965), emphasizing that collective responsibility under Section 149 does not depend on proof of individual overt acts, but on proof of membership and intent.

The judgment underscores that facilitation and logistical support (such as transportation) are sufficient indicators of participation and shared common object.

The Court also highlighted the limited scope for interference with concurrent findings of guilt in cases where evidence clearly demonstrates common intention and concerted action.

This ruling further clarifies the distinction between mere presence and active participation — the latter being sufficient to attract liability under Section 149 IPC.

The case serves as an important reaffirmation of vicarious liability principles, balancing deterrence for group crimes with fairness in evidentiary standards