State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad, 1961

• The Prosecution story in brief is that in the first case, Criminal Appeal 146 of 1958, the appellant is the State of Bombay. The respondent and another person were charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, as well as Section 19(e) of the Indian Arms Act (XI of 1878).
• The Trial Court found him guilty of those counts and sentenced him to life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C., as well as two years hard imprisonment under the Arms Act.
• The identification of the respondent as one of the two accused perpetrators was the most significant matter to be determined by the Court throughout the trial. The Court’s decision on respondent, as one of the two alleged perpetrators, was the most crucial. In addition to other evidence, the prosecution introduced a chit purportedly in his handwriting and handed by him.
• To substantiate that evidence was written by the respondent, the police got three specimen handwritings from him throughout the inquiry on three distinct sheets of paper labelled Exs. 27, 28, and 29.
• The Handwriting Expert examined the contested document, Ex.5, with the acknowledged handwritings on Exs. 27, 28, and 29, concluding that they were all written by the same individual. The admissibility of the specimen writings included in Exs. 27, 28, and 29 was contested throughout the trial and in the High Court considering the stipulations of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution.
• The accused’s specimen writings were collected by the police while he was in police custody, however it was questioned whether the accused was compelled to produce those writings within the sense of cl. (3) of Art. 20.
• Based on their findings, the High Court concluded that the respondent’s identification had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, they acquitted him, giving him the benefit of the doubt.
• The State of Bombay petitioned this Court for special leave to appeal the High Court’s judgement and order of acquittal.

1. Whether the "right against self-incrimination" guaranteed in Article 20(3) of the Constitution was breached by the involuntary administration of the disputed techniques?
2. Whether such specimens were taken in police custody under extreme pressure?
3. Whether Court’s request to an accused person present in Court to provide his specimen writing and signature for the purpose of comparison under the terms of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act violates the basic right contained in Article 20(3) of the Constitution?

ARGUMENT:- 

The argument stated by the council that who contended that the clause aforesaid of the Constitution gives complete protection of the widest amplitude to an accused person, irrespective of the time and place and of the nature of the evidence, whether it is oral or documentary or material. The extreme form, which his argument took can best be stated in his own words as follows : 

"Anything caused, by any kind of threat or inducement, to be said or done, by a person, accused or likely to be accused of any offence, by non-voluntary positive act or speech, of that person which furthers the cause of any prosecution against him or which results or is likely to result in the incrimination of hat person qua any offence, is violative of the, fundamental right guaranteed under el. of Art. 20 of the Constitution of India”.

JUDGMENT:- 

“No one accused of any crime shall be compelled to testify against himself.” The Full Court considered these provisions in the case of M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra.

• The Court rejected the idea that while undergoing trial for violation of Fence, the right against testimonial compulsion should be limited to oral testimony on the witness stand.
• The Court went on to say that “to be a witness” is “to supply evidence,” which includes not only the accused’s spoken testimony or written declarations, but also the production of an object or evidence by other methods.
• While agreeing with M.P. Sharma, the Supreme Court said that to be witness did not entail summoning a person accused of an offence to produce his thumb impression, impression of palm or fingers, or sample handwriting or signature, even though all these falls within the scope of furnishing evidence.
• The court found that, while it was vital to preserve the rights of the accused, it was also necessary to provide law enforcement and courts with information that may assist them in apprehending lawbreakers.
• Overall, it was determined that evidence that was significant and delivered in personal capacity while employing the accused’s mental faculties might be deemed within the scope of the protection provided by Article20(3).
• It was held that the delivery of a statement by an accused in police custody offered the court no basis to think that coercion was used in its acquisition.

The Court Conclude in this case that reached by the majority of the Bench that there is no infringement of Art.20(3) of the Constitution by compelling an accused person to give his specimen handwriting or signature; or impressions of his fingers, palm or foot to the investigating officer or under orders of a court for the purpose of comparison under the provisions of S. 73 of the Indian Evidence Act; though we have not been able to agree with the view of our learned brethren that, "to be a witness" in Art.20(3) should be 'equated with the imparting of personal knowledge or that an accused does not become a witness when he produces some document not in his own handwriting even though it may tend to prove facts in issue or relevant facts against him.