Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India, 2015

• Mumbai Police in 2012 arrested two women (Shaheen Dhada and Rinu Srinivasan) for posting allegedly offensive and objectionable comments on Facebook about the propriety of shutting down the city of Mumbai after the death of a political leader.
• The arrest was made in response to the Shiv Sena members' bandh call in Maharashtra following the incident involving the murder of Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackery. 
• The police made the arrests under Section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000 (ITA), which punishes any person who sends through a computer resource or communication device any information that is grossly offensive, or with the knowledge of its falsity, the information is transmitted for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, insult, injury, hatred, or ill will.
• Although the police later released the women and dismissed their prosecution, the incident invoked substantial media attention and criticism. The women then filed a petition, challenging the constitutional validity of Section 66A on the ground that it violates the right to freedom of expression.
• The Supreme Court of India initially issued an interim measure in Singhal v. Union of India, (2013) 12 S.C.C. 73, prohibiting any arrest pursuant to Section 66A unless such arrest is approved by senior police officers.  In the case in hand, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the provision. 

1. Whether the IT Act’s Sections 66A, 69A, and 79 constitutionally valid?
2. Whether Section 66A of ITA violated the right to Freedom of Expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.

The Court first discussed three fundamental concepts in understanding the freedom of expression: discussion, advocacy, and incitement. According to the Court, “mere discussion or even advocacy of a particular cause however unpopular is at the heart” of the right.  And, the law may curtail freedom only when a discussion or advocacy amounts to incitement. 

As applied to the case in hand, the Court found that Section 66A is capable of limiting all forms of internet communications as it makes no distinction “between mere discussion or advocacy of a particular point of view, which may be annoying or inconvenient or grossly offensive to some and incitement by which such words lead to an imminent causal connection with public disorder, security of State etc.”

The Court further held that the law fails to establish a clear proximate relation to the protection of public order. According to the Court, the commission of an offence under Section 66A is complete by sending a message for the purpose of causing annoyance or insult. As a result, the law does not make distinction between mass dissemination and dissemination to only one person without requiring the message to have a clear tendency of disrupting public order.

As to whether Section 66A was a valid attempt to protect individuals from defamatory statements through online communications, the Court noted that the main ingredient of defamation is “injury to reputation.” It held that the law does not concern this objective because it also condemns offensive statements that may annoy or be inconvenient to an individual without affecting his reputation.

The Court also held that the government failed to show that the law intends to prevent communications that incite the commission of an offense because “the mere causing of annoyance, inconvenience, danger etc., or being grossly offensive or having a menacing character are not offenses under the Penal Code at all.”

As to petitioners’ challenge of vagueness, the Court followed the U.S. judicial precedent, which holds that “where no reasonable standards are laid down to define guilt in a Section which creates an offence, and where no clear guidance is given to either law abiding citizens or to authorities and courts, a Section which creates an offence and which is vague must be struck down as being arbitrary and unreasonable.” The Court found that Section 66A leaves many terms open-ended and undefined, therefore making the statute void for vagueness. 

The Court also addressed whether Section 66A is capable of imposing a chilling effect on the right to freedom of expression. It held that because the provision fails to define terms, such as inconvenience or annoyance, “a very large amount of protected and innocent speech” could be curtailed. 

The Court also noted the intelligible difference between information transmitted through the internet and other forms of speech, which permits the government to create separate offences related to online communications. Accordingly, the Court rejected petitioner’s argument that Section 66A was in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution against discrimination.  

The Court declined to address the Petitioners’ challenge of procedural unreasonableness since the law was already declared unconstitutional on substantive grounds. It also found Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act to be unconstitutional as applied to Section 66A. 

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court invalidated Section 66A of ITA in its entirety as it violated the right to freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. 

• The Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India case is a landmark judgment that significantly impacted the regulation of digital speech in India. It strengthened the constitutional protection of free speech, particularly in the online sphere, by striking down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000.
• The Shreya Singhal judgment was a historic victory for free speech in India, ensuring that digital expression remains protected under the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression. It struck down vague and overly broad laws that could be misused to suppress dissent, reinforcing India’s commitment to democracy and fundamental rights.
• This case serves as a guiding principle for ensuring that future regulations on digital platforms do not infringe upon individual liberties.