Olga Tellis & Ors. vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., 1985

Mr. A. R. Antulay, the then-chief minister of Maharashtra, issued an order on July 13 ordering the eviction of pavement and slum residents from Bombay and their deportation to their country of origin.

According to Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888, the eviction was to take place. Upon learning of the Chief Minister’s pronouncement, they filed a writ suit in the High Court of Bombay, asking for an order of injunction preventing the officers of the State Government and the Bombay Municipal Corporations from acting in the manner in question.

An ad interim injunction was issued by the High Court of Bombay and would be in effect until July 21, 1981. It was agreed by the respondents that the huts wouldn’t be pulled down until October 15, 1981.

In violation of the agreement, petitioners were packed into State Transport buses on July 23, 1981, and expelled from Bombay. –The petitioner objected to the respondent’s action because it contravenes Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution.

Additionally, they requested a declaration that Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution are violated by Sections 312, 313, and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act of 1888.

1. Whether the question of Estoppels against fundamental rights or Waiver of Fundamental Rights?
2. Does the right to life under Article 21 encompass the right to livelihood, and can eviction without proper rehabilitation violate this right?
3. Whether the Constitutionality of provisions of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 is valid?
4. Whether the pavement dwellers are “trespasser” under IPC?

ARGUMENT :-

The counsel on the applicant’s behalf argued that the “right to life” guaranteed by Article 21 included the right to a means of subsistence and that he would be deprived of his livelihood if he were expelled from his slums and its sidewalks, which would amount to a deprivation of his right to life and is, therefore, unconstitutional.

The petitioner argued that the procedure prescribed by Section 314 of the 1888 Act to eliminate intrusion on the sidewalk is arbitrary and unreasonable since it not only does not provide notification before the removal of the intrusion but also provides that the Municipal commissioner can make sure that the intrusion is eliminated “without notice.”

The defense counsel stated that the pavement residents had admitted to the High Court that they did not claim any basic right to install cabins on sidewalks or public roads and they would not prevent their demolition after the scheduled date.

On the issue of natural justice, it was argued that this possibility of hearing should be given to whom? The intruder who has invaded public property? Or to people who commit a crime?

JUDGMENT :-––

• The Court in this case view that determination means of sustenance were part of the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The State was required to ensure that its citizens had sufficient means of survival including the right to work.
• The Court concluded that there could be no estoppel claims against Fundamental Rights. Pavement occupants hold the right to income generation, which is a subset of the Right to Life. The Court also advocated alternative resettlement.
• The Court construed that implementation of Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 should be humane and considerate towards the marginalized.
• Furthermore, the Court stated that because the petitioners were forced to reside in the slums due to involuntary activities, there was no malafide purpose and hence no criminal trespass. The Principles established by this judgment have been largely affirmed in numerous cases resulting in evictions without any notice.

The Supreme Court's judgment reflects a commitment to humanitarian values by acknowledging the plight of pavement dwellers and recognizing their right to livelihood as integral to the right to life under Article 21.​

Recognition of Procedural Rights: The Court emphasized that, despite the legality of eviction under Articles 14 and 19, the affected individuals are entitled to the right to be heard, a fundamental aspect of natural justice that was violated in this case.​

Advancement of Socio-Economic Rights through Civil Liberties: This case serves as an example of utilizing civil and political rights to promote social rights, thereby expanding the interpretation of the right to life to encompass the right to livelihood.​

Limitations in Securing Right to Settlement: While the judgment broadened the scope of Article 21, it fell short in providing a concrete right to settlement or rehabilitation for the evicted individuals, leading to potential injustices.​

Application of Utilitarian Principles: The decision reflects Jeremy Bentham's principle of utility, aiming for "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," by balancing urban development with the rights of vulnerable populations.​

Non-Criminalization of Pavement Dwellers: The Court refrained from labeling pavement dwellers as criminal trespassers, acknowledging their socio-economic compulsions and the necessity of their informal settlements for survival.​

Judicial Willingness to Uphold Broader Justice: The judgment indicates the Court's readiness to interpret constitutional provisions expansively to uphold broader principles of justice and human dignity.