Landmark Judgement

Gian Kaur V. State Of Punjab, 1996

Right to life; Right to die

Supreme Court·21 March 1996
Gian Kaur V. State Of Punjab, 1996
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Judgement Details

Court

Supreme Court

Date of Decision

21 March 1996

Judges

G.T. Verma ⦁ Jagdish Saran Ray ⦁ G.N. Singh ⦁ N.P. Faizan Uddin ⦁ Nanavati

Citation

(1996) 2 SCC 648

Acts / Provisions

Article 21, Right to life, Right to die, Indian Constitution; Section 309/306, Indian Penal Code;

Facts of the Case

  • In the instant matter, the Petitioner, Gian Kaur and her husband Harbans Singh were charged and committed the offence of abetment to suicide of their daughter-in-law, Kulwant Kaur.

     

  • For the same, they both were convicted by Trial Court under Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. So, they were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a term of 6 years each and were liable to pay the fine of Rupees 2000/- or in default of paying the same amount, further rigorous imprisonment for 9 months would be enforced.

     

  • Further, they made an appeal at High Court who reiterated the Trial Court’s decision. However, the sentence of Gian Kaur has been reduced from 6 years to rigorous imprisonment for 3 years.

     

  • Through Special Leave Petition, the said appellants approached the Supreme Court against their conviction sentence under Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Issues

 

  • Whether Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is constitutionally valid or not, in the light of the present case?
  • Whether Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India?

 

Judgement

The Supreme Court’s constitution bench in Gian Kaur Vs. State of Punjab view that the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution does not include the right to die or the right to be killed, thereby providing some clarity on the constitutionality of Section 309 of the Code of 1860. The Apex Court’s observations are provided hereunder:

  • The importance of ‘sanctity of life’ should not be disregarded. Article 21 guarantees the protection of life and personal liberty, and extinction of life cannot be construed to encompass the protection of life by any stretch of the imagination. Whatever the philosophical justification exists for allowing a person to end his/her life by suicide, the Court considered it impossible to read Article 21 to include the right to die as a fundamental right provided therein. Although the ‘right to life’ is a natural right enshrined in Article 21, suicide is an unnatural termination or extinction of life, and hence incompatible with the idea of the right to life.
  • Article 21’s word ‘life’ has been interpreted as life with human dignity to give it meaning and content. Any component of life that makes it dignified may be read into it, but not that which extinguishes it and, as a result, is incompatible with life’s continuous existence, culminating in the effacing of the right itself. If there is a right to die, it is essentially incompatible with the right to life, just as death is incompatible with life. The Supreme Court had also held that there is no requirement of awarding any minimum sentence with respect to the offence of attempt to suicide. The sentence of imprisonment or fine is not compulsory but discretionary. Taking these reasons into consideration, the Apex Court concluded that Section 309 is not violative of constitutional provisions and therefore is valid.

Held

  • The Petitioner challenge the constitutional validity of Section 306, IPC rests on the decision in P. Rathinam vs. Union of India and Anr, by a Bench of two Judges of this Court wherein Section 309, IPC has been held to be unconstitutional as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. It is urged that ‘right to die’ being included in Article 21 of the Constitution as held in P. Rathinam declaring Section 309, IPC to be unconstitutional, any person alletting the commission of suicide by another is merely assisting in the enforcement of the fundamental right under Article 21 and therefore, Section 306 of IPC penalising assisted suicide is equally violative of Article.
  • The State Counsels argued that Section 306 and Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 were independent of each other and grooved different offences. They believed that a Section 306 can exist without Section 309. Hence, Section 306 isn’t invalid and not in violation of either Articles 14 or 21. Another Counsel contented that Section 306 was independent of Section 306 of IPC and he didn’t support the held in P. Rathinam vs. Union of India and Anr to incorporate that “Right to Die” under Article 21 of the Constitution, inspite he supported the conclusion that Section 309 is unconstitutional as it was arbitrary.

Analysis

This Case deals with the constitutional validity of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with the offense of abetment to suicide. The appellants, Gian Kaur and her husband Harbans Singh, were convicted by the trial court under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000 each for abetting the commission of suicide by Kulwant Kaur. The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, arguing that it was violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.