Ajaz Ahmed v. UT of J&K, 2026

The petitioner, Ajaz Ahmed, a government teacher, was implicated in an FIR involving the recovery of arms, ammunition, and posters of a banned outfit from co-accused individuals.

During investigation, it was revealed that his involvement was indirect, and he acted under coercion, threat, and pressure from co-accused Gulshan Ahmed.

The petitioner asserted that he had no prior knowledge of the criminal conspiracy or unlawful activities.

After the filing of the final report (challan), the petitioner expressed willingness to make a full and true disclosure of all material facts.

He sought a pardon under Section 306 CrPC (now Section 343 BNSS), conditional upon cooperating with the prosecution.

The Chief Judicial Magistrate granted the pardon, and the petitioner was formally made an approver.

His statement was recorded, and he was examined during trial, where he gave consistent, uncontradicted, and truthful testimony in both examination-in-chief and cross-examination.

Despite complete compliance with the conditions of pardon, the Trial Court rejected his bail application, relying solely on Section 306(4)(b), stating that an approver must remain in custody until the termination of trial.

The petitioner challenged this order before the High Court under Section 528 BNSS, arguing that continued detention violated his fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21.

The High Court held that the detention of an approver under Section 306(4)(b) is not absolute and cannot be interpreted as mandatory in all circumstances.

It clarified that the purpose of such custodial detention is protective, meaning to safeguard the approver from possible threats, indignation, or retaliation from co-accused persons.

The Court emphasized that the provision is not punitive and cannot be used to punish an individual who has cooperated with the justice system.

It interpreted the phrase “unless he is already on bail” to indicate that the legislature intended flexibility, not rigidity.

The Court noted that the petitioner had fully complied with the conditions of pardon by giving a full, true, and consistent disclosure of facts.

It observed that continued detention after such compliance serves no legal or protective purpose.

The Court held that the High Court has the authority to invoke its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS to secure the ends of justice.

It ruled that denial of bail in such circumstances amounts to a violation of Article 21, which guarantees personal liberty.

The Trial Court’s order was found to be legally flawed for treating detention as mandatory without considering constitutional safeguards.

Accordingly, the High Court quashed the impugned order and directed that the petitioner be considered for release on bail subject to reasonable conditions ensuring safety and compliance.

The Court adopted a purposive interpretation, focusing on the object and intent of the law rather than a rigid literal reading.

It reinforced the primacy of fundamental rights, particularly personal liberty under Article 21, over procedural technicalities.

The judgment clarifies the legal position that an approver, after fulfilling the conditions of pardon, transitions into a cooperative witness, not a detained accused.

It strengthens the concept of judicial discretion, ensuring that courts are not mechanically bound by statutory wording.

By invoking inherent powers, the Court reaffirmed its role in preventing abuse of process of law and ensuring justice.

The reliance on precedent such as Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar ensures doctrinal consistency regarding the protective purpose of detention.

The judgment also acknowledges that if the approver violates conditions (e.g., false evidence), action can be taken under Section 308 CrPC, thus maintaining accountability.

Overall, the ruling creates a balanced approach between fair trial requirements, witness protection, and individual liberty.